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Abstract 
This paper draws on the work of Giorgio Agamben to understand how the social organisation 
of care transitions can reduce people to their ‘bare’ life thereby making harmful and 
degrading treatment seemingly legitimate. The findings of a two-year ethnographic study 
show how some people experience hospital discharge as undignified, inhumane and unsafe 
process, expressed through their lack of involvement in care planning, delayed discharge 
from hospital, and poorly coordinated care. Our analysis explores how these experiences 
stem from the way patients are constituted as ‘unknown’ and ‘ineligible’ subjects and, in 
turn, how professionals become ‘not responsible’ for their care. In effect the person is reduce 
to their ‘bare’ life with limited value within the care system. We suggest the social production 
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of ‘bare life’ is an inadvertent consequence of reconciling and aligning multiple disciplines 





It is a terrible irony that health and care systems intended to care for people when they are 
at their most vulnerable, are also sites where degrading and harmful treatment is all too 
common (Mandelstam 2011). This has been powerfully demonstrated by high-profile reports 
into unsafe, abusive and undignified care within the English care system (Department of 
Health 2012; Francis 2013; Kirkup 2015). These reveal systemic failures due, in part, to 
shortcomings in professional regulation; cultures that foster unsafe practice; and managers 
that place operational priorities ahead of patient safety. And whilst these might be extreme 
cases, research suggests that patient safety remains an intractable problem for all healthcare 
systems (Dixon-Woods and Pronovost 2016).  
 
In turn, quality and safety improvements have focused on modernising professional 
regulation (Walshe and Shortell 2004), creating a more compassionate ‘safety culture’ 
(Morello et al. 2013), and introducing more proactive risk management (Waring 2005). And 
yet, such efforts often involve techno-managerialist solutions that miss the point that culture 
change rarely occurs as ‘planned’ or that (mis-) management and (over-) regulation might be 
part of the problem (Waring et al. 2016a). In short, they can remake the practices and 
cultures that foster degrading and harmful treatment.  
 
We suggest the experiences of harmful and degrading care described in reports indicate a 
mode of social organisation in which people’s lives, under certain circumstances, can hold 
little meaning or value within the care system (Mandelstam 2011). Sociologists have long 
recognised the harmful and dehumanising effects of bureaucracy (Ritzer 2006) and whilst 
professions are sometimes portrayed as moral guardians for society (Durkheim 1992), they 
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have also been shown to prioritise collegial self-interest ahead of their clients’ needs 
(Rosenthal 1995). We suggest the systemic devaluation of human life is brought about, not 
only by instrumental rationality or professional cultures, but by more fundamental socio-
cultural and organisational arrangements in which certain lives are constituted as less 
valuable and, therefore, amenable to neglectful or harmful treatment. In seeking to develop 
new sociological understanding of this phenomena we turn to the ideas of Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben. Agamben’s work deals with how political-judicial systems can render life as 
‘devoid of value’, thereby making suffering, degradation and death entirely legitimate 
(Agamben 1998). His work builds upon Foucault’s (1998) concept of ‘bio-power’ by arguing 
that the contemporary ‘politics of life’ is rooted in classical thresholds of citizenship that are 
ultimately determined through sovereign authority (Agamben 2005). We draw upon 
Agamben’s ideas in our ethnographic study of hospital discharge. 
 
Hospital discharge denotes the stage where inpatient care ends and continuing care is 
provided in community settings. International research shows this can be a challenging and 
unsafe stage in the care pathway (Aase et al. 2017; Hesselink et al. 2012; Laugaland et al. 
2014; Waring et al. 2016b), with patients often feeling abandoned and stigmatised as they 
leave hospital (Healthwatch 2015). Although some people involved in our study experienced 
well-organised discharge, others received unsafe and inhumane (non-)care. Foreshadowing 
our findings, some had little influence on their care plans; some were discharged at night, 
alone to unfamiliar locations; and many arrived home with limited support for eating, 
sleeping or toileting. We wanted to understand why people experience unsafe and 
undignified hospital discharge; despite the commitment and good intentions of care 
professionals. Existing sociological research highlights, for instance, how professional 
 5 
boundaries and financial pressures create obstacles to integrated care (Allen 2014). 
Agamben’s ideas help us understand how the social organisation of discharge can reduce 
people to a ‘bare’ life with limited value or meaning, which in turn normalises unsafe and 
undignified care. Unlike Agamben, we suggest this arises less from sovereign (political-legal) 
power and more from the incompatibilities of multiple decentred systems that inadvertently 
render certain people ‘unknown’, ‘ineligible’ and ‘unvalued’.  
 
 
Agamben’s Homo Sacer and States of Exception 
 
Agamben’s work considers how political-judicial (sovereign) systems (re-)define what it 
means to be human (Genel 2006). His work attends to the ways sovereign systems can 
deprive people of legal rights and protections, thereby making their suffering, degradation 
and death entirely legitimate. The Holocaust provides the backdrop to his thinking, but rather 
than explaining totalitarianism, dictatorships and death camps as the exclusive phenomena 
of the Nazi state, he locates these possibilities in the history of Western political-legal 
thought, arguing that similar processes of dehumanisation persist in contemporary society 
(Agamben 2005). His ideas engage, in particular, with Foucault’s work on ‘bio-power’. In his 
later works, Foucault invoked this concept to describe how the optimisation of productive 
human life had become the primary object of modern government (Foucault 1998). Although 
sovereign power can still determine ‘life and death’, Foucault saw ‘bio-power’ as realised 
through a decentred assemblage of discursively constituted institutions, calculations and 
technologies. Agamben’s work can be seen as correcting and completing Foucault’s ideas in 
two areas (Colebrook and Maxwell 2016). The first is to re-emphasise the fundamental 
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significance of sovereign power in relation to bio-power, and the second is to suggest that 
(sovereign) bio-power is not only a feature of modern government, but is an enduring 
feature of Western legal-political systems. 
 
Drawing on Greek philosophy, Agamben (1998) highlights a distinction between ‘bare’ life 
(zoe) and ‘qualified’ life (bios). The former describes the most fundamental, biological 
parameters of life, and the latter a life with social, legal and political significance. For 
Agamben, the distinction between ‘bare’ and ‘qualified’ life structures social and political 
existence; with the boundary between the two determined through sovereign (political-
judicial) authority (Agamben 1998). In ancient Greece, a ‘qualified’ life was the basis of 
meaningful citizenship and political participation. It is an act of political and legal inclusion, 
that is given and safeguarded through law; which by implication makes exclusion possible 
through removal of rights and return to ‘bare life’. According to Agamben, the potential for 
sovereign power to define the value of human life is a constant feature of Western society 
(Colebrook and Maxwell 2016).  
 
This distinction is elaborated in Agamben’s (1998) writing on homo sacer – a concept derived 
from Roman law to designate someone who can be legitimately killed, but not sacrificed. The 
idea of ‘sacred’, in this sense, is different from contemporary use, describing someone who is 
accursed or outside of the law. The sovereign determination of homo sacer means a person is 
confined to their ‘bare’ life and can therefore be killed within impunity. For Agamben, the 
homo sacer is significant because, although the individual might be outside of the law, they 
are still subject to its influence, in so much that the law determines their outside position. 
This reveals a paradoxical position where the homo sacer is simultaneously inside and outside 
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political-juridical jurisdiction (much like a sovereign who is simultaneously the basis of and 
above the law).  
 
Agamben (2005) uses these ideas to interpret the relationship between the state and the 
citizen, especially in his analysis of the Holocaust. Agamben cites Carl Schmitt’s (1985) maxim 
that the ‘sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception’. A ‘state of exception’ is a 
situation in which established democratic processes, legal protections and citizenship rights 
are suspended and replaced by forms of executive or dictatorial power, such as a State of 
Emergency or Marshall Law. This ‘legalised lawlessness’ (Humphreys 2006) is typically 
premised on the need to safeguard social order, i.e. civil liberties are temporarily curtailed to 
protect civil liberties. Significantly, a state of exception can remove legal protections for 
entire social groups, limiting them to a ‘bare life’ and making possible inhumane treatment. 
The extermination camps of the Nazi regime exemplify this, but it can be found in other 
situations, such as Guantanamo Bay (Agamben, 2005). A state of exception is not a place or 
mode of governance, rather it is the threshold that defines the boundary between ‘qualified’ 
life and ‘bare’ life. This threshold is not a hidden or subverted feature of the modern state 
rather it is a foundation of political-judicial authority or ‘sovereign bio-power’ (Fiskesjo 2012). 
 
States of exception in health and healthcare 
 
Whilst Foucault’s ideas have had enormous influence in medical sociology, Agamben’s (1998) 
have been more limited. In his writings, he talks of ‘overcoma’ and ‘neomort’ (equivalent to 
permanent vegetative states) as situations in which human life is reduced to its most basic 
biological functions (Lemke 2011). In such situations, scientists and ethicists debate the bio-
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political threshold of life and death as an expression of sovereign authority (Norris 2000). 
Agamben’s ideas can be applied to other aspects of contemporary healthcare where 
‘pathways’ to death are made possible through the legitimate curtailment of legal 
protections. The controversial Liverpool Care Pathway, for example, was established to 
support dignified end-of-life care, but the drive towards standardisation and rationalisation 
(Neuberger et al. 2013) might suggest it functioned as a procedural ‘threshold’ for 
establishing a person’s ‘bare life’ and depriving care. Institutions for people with mental 
health problems, learning disabilities, dementia or other long-term conditions have also been 
shown to harbour harmful, abusive and degrading treatment (e.g. Department of Health 
2012; Mandelstam 2011). Ethnographies of care homes further show how staff are unable to 
care when expected to comply with standardised procedures, government regulations and 
corporate pressures (DeForge et al. 2011). Although such cases reveal how economic and 
political pressures condition or exacerbate undignified and harmful treatment (e.g. Francis 
2013), Agamben’s ideas draw attention to the way life itself is (de-) valued in these social and 
political systems. 
 
We draw upon Agamben’s ideas to develop new thinking about the thresholds of life that are 
experienced during hospital discharge. As noted above, this care transition can be distressing, 
degrading and harmful (Healthwatch 2015; Waring et al. 2016b). Research tends to 
emphasise the micro-level dynamics of inter-professional communication and coordination 
as complicating care transitions (Kripalani et al. 2007; Waring et al. 2015), or the influence of 
macro-level resource constraints as undermining continuity of care (Glasby 2003). 
Accordingly, improvement interventions tend to focus on technical solutions for better 
communication, discharge planning, or resource sharing (Aase et al. 2017). As in other areas 
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of patient safety, there is limited consideration of how people are (de-) valued through these 
processes. 
 
Drawing upon Agamben’s ideas, hospital discharge can be interpreted as crossing various 
social, cultural and political thresholds – hospital/home, inpatient/outpatient, unwell/well. 
When inside the hospital it might be suggested that, to some extent, a person’s ‘bare’ life 
comes to the fore of bio-medical attention; with their ‘qualified’ life temporarily limited. 
Discharge might then appear to be a return to a more ‘qualified’ life, but for many this is 
complicated by on-going illness and long-term care. Agamben’s idea help us think about how 
professional expertise and scientific evidence, alongside organisational-legal bureaucracies, 
contribute to these processes as a delegated function of sovereign power, for example where 
criteria of discharge planning establish the threshold of ‘bare’ life. As elaborated below, this 
is not necessarily the consequence of any individual decision or legal determination, but an 
inadvertent consequence of incompatible decisions and determinations. 
 
 
The study  
 
Study setting 
Our ethnographic study was carried out between 2011 and 2014 in two ‘care systems’ in the 
English National Health Services (NHS). The term ‘care system’ describes the configuration of 
inter-connected organisations involved in the delivery of health and care at the municipal 
level. Each system comprised a single NHS Trust providing specialist care, around which 
community health and social care services were configured, including general practitioners 
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(GPs), community hospitals, rehabilitation services, local authority social services, and nursing 
homes. To focus our enquiries, the study investigated the discharge of stroke and hip 
fracture patients, because these patients typically have complex care needs and present a 
particular challenge to discharge planning. As discussed below, it might be assumed that 
younger or less complex patients would not receive the types of care observed.  
 
Data collection 
Ethnographic fieldwork was carried out by the authors for 10 months in each system. We 
collaborated, in the first instance, with clinical leaders to gain access to the stroke and 
orthopaedic services; and to identify and recruit relevant staff groups in hospital and 
community settings. Observations were carried out over multiple stages to refine our 
understanding of hospital discharge. Initially, we ‘mapped’ care processes through observing 
daily routines, followed by in-depth observations of key situations and activities, such as 
planning meetings and referral processes, and then we ‘shadowed’ key individuals, such as 
discharge coordinators, ward nurses, and doctors. Observations were recorded in hand-
written field journals. 
 
The study also ‘shadowed’ 30 patients over the course of their care transition. Patients were 
recruited in collaboration with medical staff who identified those who were soon to be 
discharged, and who could speak English or had family members to assist with 
communication. The designated clinician for each patient introduced a researcher to the 
patient at the bedside, whereupon the study was described, and a participant information 
sheet provided. Patients (with their relatives) were then re-approached by a researcher 24-
48 hours later to answer questions and seek consent. Sampling intended to reflect 
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differences in age, gender, ethnicity and residence, but recruitment needed to be 
opportunistic because of the challenges of recruiting and retaining patients, who were often 
very unwell and confused. Given these challenges, it was not always possible to obtain 
comprehensive socio-demographic data, especially age, ethnicity and residence. 30 
participants were recruited and interviewed in hospital within 72 hours of discharge; 27 
interviewed within 2 weeks of discharge, and then 17 and 9 participants at four- and six-
weeks, respectively. The reduction in participation reflected the challenges of recruitment, 
e.g. 4 were re-admitted, 3 left the area, 5 were unable to participate due to ill health, and 6 
passed away. Patients and/or relatives were invited to keep a reflective diary that asked 
participants to ‘describe daily activities following discharge, especially contact with health and 
social care workers’ (8 completed). Patient advisors suggested a paper-based, minimally 
structured diary was preferable because participants would likely be elderly, with low IT 
literacy and with possible cognitive impairments. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 213 individuals across the study sites (Table 
1). Participants were purposively sampled during fieldwork on the basis of their observed 
involvement in discharge processes. The interviews explored: career biographies, roles and 
responsibilities in discharge, communication processes, and perceptions of risk. Interviews 
were recorded with the consent of participants. Four focus groups were undertaken with 
community-based professionals, including GPs (n:4 & 7), ambulance services (n:3), and 
community rehabilitation specialists (n:12). These asked participants to individually describe 
(or draw) their understanding of a ‘typical’ discharge, followed by a group exercise to 
deliberate and ‘map out’ the discharge processes.  All names have been changed to assure 
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the confidentiality and anonymity of participants. The study received favourable ethical 
approach through standard NHS research governance arrangements. 
 
Table 1: Interview Participants 
 
Group System 1 System 2 Total 
Medical (hospital) 10 8 18 
Nursing 18 15 33 
HCAs 5 2 7 
Occupational Therapists 10 10 20 
Physiotherapists 16 8 24 
Other therapists (speech, dieticians) 2 3 5 
Pharmacists 1 2 3 
Ambulance manager 1 1 2 
Administrative 2 2 4 
Hospital/Ward Management 3 3 6 
Social Work 9 5 14 
Social Care 2 2 4 
Community Nursing 2 7 9 
General Practitioners 1 2 3 
GP/CCG administration 2 0 2 
Support group/voluntary  4 2 6 
Patients  16 14 30 
Carers/Family 12 11 23 




Data analysis aimed to develop a rich descriptive and interpretative understanding of 
discharge processes. Following Corbin and Strauss (2014), this involved an iterative process 
of open coding; constant comparison; elaboration of cross-cutting themes; and engagement 
with wider literature. We initially open-coded our observed and participants’ reported 
experiences of discharge, which were categorised around different settings, activities and 
events. These were further analysed as second-order codes; for example, the category of 
‘harms and safety’ formed part of a broader theme of ‘Follow-on care’, and these were 
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further analysed as higher-order themes. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate our coding process with 
additional extracts of data. We acknowledge that from the standpoint of the academic 
researcher, interpretations of clinical appropriateness and in/humane care are shaped by our 
own position and moral sensibilities. To be more confident in our interpretations we 
discussed interpretations with study advisors. As thematic analysis progressed, candidate 
theories were considered to explain the social organisation of discharge, including 
sociological accounts of bureaucracy and professional cultures. Through this iterative 
process, the work of Agamben was used to help interpret findings and inform thematic 
analysis. We present our findings along three lines. First, we describe how, for some patients, 
hospital discharge is experienced as degrading and unsafe; second, we describe how these 
experiences are shaped by the social organisation of hospital discharge; finally, we discuss 




The experiences of ‘bare’ life in hospital discharge 
Almost all participants described discharge as an important symbolic spatial-temporal 
‘threshold’ between hospital and community that represented aspirations for recovery, 
wellbeing and dignity - a return to a more ‘qualified’ life. For some, this threshold was 
experienced as undignified and distressing, or in ways that appeared to precipitate a more 
enduring ‘bare’ life. Participants talked of these negative experiences in terms of their limited 
influence in care planning, scheduling of discharge, and provision of follow-on care.  
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A key stage in discharge planning is determining a patient’s ‘readiness’ for discharge 
according to their reduced need for hospital care and suitability for care in the community. 
Participants described having little influence on these decisions and reported feeling 
frustrated that that their wishes and important aspects of their personal circumstances were 
not sufficiently considered.  
 
‘Ward round: consultant introduces herself to the patient, asks ‘how are you doing 
today’. She then says they are thinking about when ‘you might go home’. The 
consultant then talks to a junior doctor about some results and the nurse about the 
patient’s mobility and confusion, but without really talking to the patient directly… 
they talk over and about the patient.’ (Fieldnote)  
 
‘Doctor visited ward round. Did not speak to me on his ward round. No discussion 
about discharge. Feel like I’m invisible. I am getting agitated with staff. They just stand 
about taking no notice.’ (Flo, Hip fracture, White British) 
 
A prominent anxiety for patients related to the plans for their future living arrangements with 
many describing a sense of apprehension, even fear about what ‘will happen next’. Most 
wished to return ‘home’, but some felt clinicians and social workers, often in collusion with 
relatives, were planning a move to a residential facility. Too often, it seemed patients were 
easily treated as passive subjects, rather than active participants in care planning.  
 
A further concern was the scheduling of discharge, especially where discharge was delayed. 
Many participants were given an ‘estimated date of discharge’ to which great symbolic 
 15 
importance was attached, and yet, this date was regularly revised due to deteriorating health 
or difficulties in arranging community care. These delays were deeply frustrating for patients, 
with some alluding to the idea that being ‘kept in hospital’ curtailed their liberty.  
 
‘It’s like the goal-post get moved and moved and moved. Just when you think about 
getting going home, they take it away from you.’ (Bob, Stroke, White British, Field 
journal) 
 
By turns, patients described being told about their discharge only shortly before it occurred. 
This led to an intensive period in which they needed to dress, contact family, and confirm 
arrangements. Some talked of being ‘thrown out of hospital’. A highly distressing occurrence 
was when patients were discharged to community hospital or care homes late at night, 
usually alone and with little information about where they were going and for how long.  
 
‘From half-past in the morning…to strip my bed, and I sitting on a chair from that time 
till I got home. It had done eight o’clock at night. I felt like I wanted t cry because, you 
know, I felt they just didn’t care’. (Thelma, Hip Fracture, 79, White British) 
 
On the day of discharge some patients were moved to a ‘discharge lounge’ whilst 
arrangements for their medicines and transportation was finalised; which released the 
hospital bed for the next inpatient. Although intended for short-term use, we observed how 
patients spent many hours waiting here, in unsuitable seating and without specialist care. 
Even nurses described it as a ‘holding pen’ with obvious parallels with animal transportation.  
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‘It’s a holding area. Some wards send patients down there at half-past eight and they’re 
there till four o’clock and they’ve not had a hot meal.’ (Nurse). 
 
Once in the community, patients experienced common problems with care quality. Some 
described having limited or no contact with their GP following discharge and others 
described how their GP would know little about the care received in hospital or plans for on-
going recovery. We were informed by both patients and GPs that discharge letters were 
often delayed and could lacked important information.   
 
‘Researcher: Have you seen your GP? 
Patient: No. I’ll tell you why. Because the last I went, I’ve been passing out and I’d just 
been in the hospital. And her exact words to me were, ‘Fred, I don’t know how to treat 
you because haven’t heard anything from the hospital’ 
 
Patients also talked of being sent home with incomplete or incorrect medicines, or with 
limited understanding of how to take them. They described finding it difficult to book 
community nurses to treat wounds, change dressing or give injections, and that often 
relatives were required to carry out such tasks. 
 
‘[I was] given bag of medications but no instructions. No idea what they are for.’ 
(Maurice, Hip Fracture, White British, Diary) 
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‘Heart nurse said BP was low. Increased Furosemide to two tabs. [But] Furosemide did 
not arrive! Rang [pharmacy] about Furo tabs. No prescriptive received from surgery’ 
(William, Stroke, White British, diary) 
 
In other ways, community health and social care workers described how it was usual for care 
plans, devised by hospital staff, to neglect important information related to ongoing needs, 
such as when to arrange out-patient appointments or what types of physical therapy were 
needed. This meant patients’ initial encounters with community services were often poorly 
specified and required rapid revision. 
 
‘We see patients when they get home and we look for their care plan, and its nothing, 
it’s just a few notes about mobilisation or medicines. There is nothing detailed about 
what level of care they need. We spend a lot of time re-assessing the patient and 
devising new care plans’ (Social care) 
 
In such circumstances, participants talked of the difficulties of managing basic tasks, such as 
dressing, cooking and personal hygiene. For some, this was exacerbated by the failure to 
provide required aides, such as grab-rails, steps, or toilet seats. Two patients returned home 
requiring a special bed, but one found that it did not fit in their house, whilst another was 
provided with the bedframe but no mattress.  
‘We needed a hospital bed downstairs, so it arrived last Saturday, but it will not do.  The 
chap said … I thought it could go in the hall, but even if we move furniture it blocks the 
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stairs… If you bring it forwards so that we could then get out of the front door you 
couldn’t get in here. So now we help him upstairs, you only go up once and down.  
Down’s a bit tricky but I help him and we’re managing.’ (Jenny, Spouse, Stroke) 
 
Patients also had anxieties about when their care package would end, and their longer-term 
care needs. Given pressures on the care system, care was often sporadic and partial, with 
late or missed activities.  It was also clear that most participants relied upon relatives and 
friends to help with basic personal care and to ‘manage’ the care system by coordinating 
social care visits, chasing-up prescriptions and arranging appointments. Many of our patients 
described themselves as a burden on their family and as abandoned by the care system. 
 
‘The nurse was supposed to come back again. She didn’t say exactly when she was 
coming but nobody’s been since. So, nobody’s really checked me over.’ (Ralph, 
Stroke, 73, White British) 
 
‘Sunday: No carer, I managed on my own, but I feel tired. 
Monday: No carer again. Trouble with too frequent visits to the toilet’ (Sidney, Stroke, 




The social production of ‘bare life’ 
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We next describe how the experiences outlined above were made possible, even acceptable 
through the social organisation of hospital discharge. Our analysis highlights three themes 
that account for why, for some people, discharge can precipitate a ‘bare’ life. An important 
contextual observation was that both care systems were experiencing severe financial 
constraints, which created an environment of pressured working and exacerbated tensions 
between professionals; allowing thresholds of exclusion to be more readily enacted.  
 
Our first theme describes how at the point of discharge certain patients are seemingly ‘not 
known’. We observed how each professional-practice group ascribed a different meaning 
onto the ‘patient’, ‘client’ or ‘service user’ and how these rendered different ‘parts’ of the 
patient visible and amenable to intervention (Foucault 1994). For example, specialist medical 
staff were usually concerned with determining ‘readiness’ for discharge based on core bio-
physiological assessments; ward nurses were concerned with measures of health and well-
being; and therapists with different aspects of mobility, speech or diet. Yet, these did not 
always come together into a coherent or shared understanding of care. For example, we 
repeatedly observed in multi-disciplinary team meetings how specialists took turns to 
present their assessment of the patient, each adhering to the evidence-based guidelines of 
their own practice, but where they often talked past one another and rarely reached a 
holistic understanding: 
 
‘Day after day we go through the same people waiting for the same assessments.  
Mental health, OT, physio, and you can go back the next day and [it’s like] you’ve 
talked to a brick wall the day before’. (Social worker) 
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‘At the MDT, his case was again reviewed in a very sequential way with staff taking 
turns. The OT described the progress made in his mobility, and the SaLT indicated that 
he no longer needed the nasogastric tube ... the ward nurse informed the group that 
his wife had left the country for a short period and there was limited family support at 
home.’ (Fieldnote) 
 
Such multi-disciplinary team meetings revealed incompatibilities amongst professionals. This 
included, for example, regular discrepancies between doctors and therapists about whether 
a patient was ‘fit’ for discharge, as well as disagreements amongst occupational therapists 
and social workers about patients’ on-going needs.  
 
‘We should be working all together, and we should all attend that MDT so that 
everybody knows.  Once it’s identified, that’s when we should go in and say get all your 
evidence, get your risk assessments, plan it properly, and then get the discharge right.  
But…we don’t have the time for that’. (Nurse) 
 
These types of interactions illustrate how professional groups tend to operate within 
bounded jurisdictions, which are often poorly integrated and not always well-aligned to the 
needs of patients. Such boundaries between professionals were especially pronounced in the 
relationship between health and social care professionals where divisions centred on 
categorisation of needs as ‘medical’ or ‘social’; which had implications for the allocation of 
caring and funding responsibilities.  The stringent criteria for ‘continuing healthcare’ (NHS 
funded) meant that seemingly very frail and dependent patients were categorised as having 
‘social’ rather than ‘medical’ needs. 
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‘It was quite clear that she was very poorly and shouldn’t have been discharged home, 
even with the care package…we have to make the patient stable….but there is only so 
much we can do on the medical-side of things.’ (Social care) 
 
‘We get a lot of flak for it because obviously we refuse a patient, it’s our fault, you 
know, it’s not because the ward have done something and haven’t done… their 
assessment is proper. It’s because we’re not accepting this patient’. (Community 
Team) 
 
It seemed therefore, people were allocated multiple, often incompatible meanings across the 
discharge process, and it was difficult to establish a sufficiently complete or stable definition 
of ‘what’ (or ‘who’) the patient is. The problem is exacerbated because at the point of 
discharge the patient is in a relatively liminal space as they transition across multiple 
professional boundaries. As such, the person becomes them ‘not known’ or a non-subject., 
creating consequent problems for determining and coordinating care, and which also makes 
it difficult to allocate professional responsibility.  
 
‘The lines of responsibility are opaque. We might have clear ideas around who 
completes continuing healthcare or financial eligibility, but it is less clear about how 
we put these together as a care plan.’ (Social work) 
 
Our second theme considers how people experiencing discharge could easily and legitimately 
be rendered ‘ineligible’ for care, especially through the use of formulaic and standardised 
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assessment procedures. We found that the problems of ‘knowing’ the person, were 
intensified by the reliance upon planning guidelines and assessment criteria that related to 
discrete and bounded areas of professional practice and which reinforced a highly 
segmented and abstract view of the person. More significantly, the widespread use of 
prescriptive assessments and criteria were often ignorant of the complex needs and personal 
circumstances of patients, leading to highly abstract and depersonalised measures, e.g. of 
mobility, falls-risk or cognitive ability. For example, assessments of a cooking abilities were 
completed in ‘mock kitchens’ that rarely resembled the patient’s home, and mobility 
assessments were carried out in controlled environments devoid of real-world hazards. 
Moreover, staff themselves reported feeling under pressure to use assessments to ‘sign-off’ 
patients and meet operational demands, rather than identify the needs of the patient. 
 
“There’s a lot of pressure there where people are trying to follow the right pathway, 
using the right checks, but they’ve also got that pressure there to say no we need the 
bed, get them out’. (Nurse) 
 
More significant, was the way formulaic assessment processes enabled professionals to 
determine people as ineligible or unsuitable for certain care services. A prominent example 
was social workers’ assessment of ongoing needs, which took into account a person’s 
personal and domestic arrangements, including finances and home ownership. Unlike 
healthcare, which is free at the point of need, social care in England is means-tested, and 
many patients were surprised to find that relatively modest savings and/or home ownership 
would make them ineligible for funded care. Also confusing for staff and patients were the 
eligibility criteria for ‘re-ablement’ and rehabilitation services, where some patients were 
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deemed ineligible because they were assessed as too complex, too old or too frail. It seemed 
that such assessments were often geared towards depriving people of services, primarily to 
cope with excessive demand and resource constraints.  As described below, community 
services could decline referrals, often citing obscure eligibility criteria. Importantly, people 
deemed ineligible for care typically left hospital with a patchwork of services. 
 
‘[N]urse initiated external referrals for social care using a computer-based referral 
system. Social services reviewed and declined the request for social care on the 
grounds that he was not formally registered as a local resident and did not have 
appropriate legal status…. The social care referral stalled at this point and remained 
unresolved.’(Fieldnote) 
 
‘OT went to the sister’s office to discuss a problematic discharge. She had found a 
curt note fastened in his patient records from a social worker, saying unless a capacity 
test is done on the gentleman today, his discharge would be further delayed.’ 
(Fieldnote) 
 
Our third theme relates to how professionals saw themselves as not responsible for care.  As 
described above, professional cultures were relatively bounded in terms of their areas of 
expert work. Such jurisdictions can complicate task sharing and coordination (Nancarrow and 
Borthwick 2005) and, in our study, seemed to make the coordination of care at the point of 
discharge difficult. That is, hospital discharge complicates the allocation of professional 
responsibility because it is experienced as a liminal spatial-temporal threshold where no one 
professional holds unambiguous responsibility for care. 
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For many hospital-based professionals, discharge planning was a major task, but it was also 
regarded as low-status and low-priority, diverting clinicians from more acute duties. For 
doctors, in particular, their clinical attention was on the urgent needs of newly admitted 
patients; with discharge seen as a low-status task for ‘finishing off’ and ‘handing over’ care. 
As such, tasks related to discharge were often devalued and delegated. This was seen, for 
example, with reduced surgical involvement in discharge planning and where doctors 
delegate responsibility for discharge planning to junior staff. The withdrawal of involvement 
might account for the problems in the continuity of medical care, as described above: 
 
‘The surgeon’s involvement…reduced dramatically. In board rounds he only 
acknowledged that [patient] care was progressing and that no significant changes had 
occurred. It seemed that the responsibility for care had been transferred to the 
rehabilitation team.’ (Fieldnote) 
 
‘The discharge summer that goes out…it’s filled by the junior doctor. Its quire a cursory 
document at time and it doesn’t necessarily reflect what’s happen’ (Care of the elderly 
doctor) 
 
Social workers and occupational therapists usually had more direct responsibility for 
discharge planning, but again with a view to determining what ‘could’ (not what ‘should’) be 
provided. Moreover, there were tensions amongst specialists about determining the levels of 
need, and in turn the allocation of responsibilities (and funding). For example, discharge 
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could be delayed whilst determining who should order and fund home-adaptions with 
responsibility for ordering equipment passed from one professional to another.  
 
‘we’ll fight over who orders what, who’s budget it’s going to come out of? ‘No. It’s a 
social commode.’ What on earth is a social commode?’ (Social Worker) 
 
‘People are happy to say there’s nothing we can do and pass it on to the next staff 
member and the next.’ (Healthcare assistant). 
 
In the community, we observed how responsibility for care was dispersed across health and 
social care providers, who rarely worked together. This meant that patients could receive 
parallel or contradictory care packages. Overall, people’s care often fell through gaps 
between organisational and professional silos. Discharge was seen by many in the hospital as 
the end point of responsibility, whilst in the community the diffuse nature of care provision 
meant that no one took responsible (Heavey et al. 2019).  
 
‘I think there just somehow seems to be a void between hospital and community where 
things sort of fall down.  Almost like a bit of a hurdle’. (Nurse) 
 
Discussion 
Our ethnographic study echoes research that describes hospital discharge as a potentially 
undignified, degrading and harmful process (Healthwatch 2015. Waring et al. 2016b). We 
show how patients, and their relatives, routinely experience discharge as disempowering and 
dehumanising, which for some could be a ‘stepping-stone’ towards more sustained forms of 
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exclusion, even ‘social death’ (Bauman 1992). Moreover, it finds that all too often those 
working within the care system accept this potential, possibly because they are pressured to 
focus on their discrete part of the care process, and because operational pressures require 
staff to ‘push’ people through the system. We are in no way suggesting that professionals 
intended to treat patients in this way, and it is important to state that the vast majority of the 
staff we interviewed expressed a deep commitment to patient care and were dismayed at 
elements of the wider system. Instead, we argue that people’s (and professionals’) negative 
experiences of care are rooted in the social organisation of hospital discharge, combined with 
the enduring pressures of increased demand and reduced resources.  
 
Three explanations are commonly invoked to explain how hospital discharge can result in 
experiences of degradation and harm. The first relates to the complexity of a person’s health 
conditions that renders their care difficult and costly. However, it does not (nor should it) 
necessarily follow that these lives hold no value. The second explanation sees the process of 
dehumanisation as a consequence of ‘bureaucracy’, where the strict division of labour, 
coupled with standardised procedures inevitably promote operational efficiency ahead of 
human dignity (Francis 2013). The third, and linking the above two viewpoints, emphasises 
the role of ‘professional boundaries’ in complicated efforts to provide safe and integrated 
care at the point of discharge (Waring et al. 2015). Although these lines of analysis provide 
important insights, they do not necessarily account for how harmful and degrading treatment 
is deeply rooted within the social and cultural systems of care. We draw upon Agamben’s 
ideas to develop a complementary, but also radical interpretation of hospital discharge that 
explores how patients are reduced to a ‘bare’ life thereby making permissible harmful and 
degrading (non-) care. 
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Our participants’ accounts suggest hospital discharge is a significant symbolic threshold 
between hospital/home or ill/well. A preliminary reflection is that patients might accepted a 
relatively passive role in hospital, with echoes of Parson’s (1975) ‘sick role’. One 
interpretation is that being in hospital involves a temporary suspension of a ‘qualified’ life - 
where a ‘bare’ life of bio-medical care comes to the fore. This makes hospital discharge a 
significant threshold for a return to a more ‘qualified’ existence; if only as an aspiration. And 
yet for some people, discharge is experienced as a ‘stepping-stone’ or ‘passage point’ to 
more fundamental and sustained exclusion and abandonment: a deepening of their ‘bare’ 
life. We are not suggesting that patients acquire the status of homo sacer in the sense that 
they can be killed with impunity, but discharge can be a threshold for rendering harm and 
degradations more likely and acceptable through the removal of care and diffusion of 
responsibility. For Agamben (2005), the ‘state of exception’ is a threshold of inclusion and 
exclusion, between ‘qualified’ and ‘bare’ life. For our study, this might be interpreted as 
‘health-state of exception’ in which certain types of patients are more easily excluded and 
reduced to their ‘bare’ life. Although it might be argued these ‘health-states’ reflect the 
nature of a patient’s health conditions or ‘health state’, especially where they are older with 
complex comorbidities. However, we argue that the production of a person’s ‘bare’ life stems 
from the way people become ‘un-known’, deemed ‘in-eligible’, and where professionals take 
no ‘responsibility’ for their care. 
 
Our study finds that professionals struggle to agree upon ‘what’ (not ‘who’) the patient is; 
not because of their complex needs, but because of the persistence of multiple, competing 
professional discourses. As such, the definition of ‘the patient’ remains elusive and outside 
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the bounds of professional practice. With parallels to the work of Mol (2002), each 
professional group ‘knows’ the patient through particular bio-medical or psycho-social 
criteria, with ‘disease’ and by implication ‘the patient’ redefined across the pathway. At the 
threshold of discharge, these multiple perspectives struggle and compete to define the 
patient, because they are simultaneously inside/outside the hospital/community. Put another 
way, there is a tendency to ‘segment’ the patient according to different ontologies (Mol 
2002), but at the liminal point of discharge where these segments are brought together to 
develop a coordinated care plan, they all too often fail to establish a holistic understanding of 
the ‘qualified’ person. Returning to Foucault’s (1994) concept of the ‘gaze’, the patient is 
both known and unknown rendering them an un-governable ‘non-subject’. This occurs not 
through sovereign (politico-legal) decision-making (Agamben 1998), but because of the 
complex eco-system of competing jurisdictions. 
 
The use of formal assessment criteria to determine eligibility further renders people as 
‘unknown’ and makes legitimate the deprivation of care. With closer alignment with 
Agamben’s work (1998), these technical instruments illustrate the type of depersonalised 
legal-bureaucratic processes that deprive people of their humanity or reduce them to their 
‘bare life’, especially through transforming complex needs into a segmented abstraction that 
can be managed within the parameters of bounded professional responsibility. Interestingly, 
these bureaucratic procedures are often realised through delegated forms of authority to 
low-grade professionals, whilst high-grade experts focus on other more specialist tasks 
(Nancarrow and Borthwick 2005). Where professionals disagree about their specialist 
assessments it further renders the person unknown, but now in a more formal and technical 
sense, creating an indeterminate site or ‘zone of exclusion’.  
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The dilemmas of ‘knowing’ the person and determining ‘eligibility’ sets the parameters for 
establishing professional ‘non-responsibility’ for care; i.e. the inability to define an eligible 
subject makes the responsibility for care diffuse (Heavey et al. 2019). This is similar to the 
‘problem of many hands’ where the distribution of responsibility amongst multiple actors can 
mean that no one actor ultimately takes responsibility for care (Dixon-Woods and Provonost 
2016). This is heightening at the liminal point of discharge, where the person is in transition 
across multiple boundaries (Waring et al. 2015). When combined, the problems of knowing 
the person, determining eligibility and allocating responsibility might be seen as a self-
reinforcing triangular relationship that determines the threshold of inclusion/exclusion or 
bare/qualified life.  
 
Although our paper focuses on the dehumanising experiences of discharge, many patients in 
our study experienced a more positive transition, and as noted above, these were often 
younger with less complex needs. Considering these more positive experiences in the context 
of the above analysis, enables us to offer tentative suggestions for how degrading and unsafe 
non-care might be avoided. First, we think it important to remember that at the centre of all 
care system are vulnerable people with rich complex lives, and rather than using labels such 
as ‘patient’, ‘service user’ or ’client’, care providers could more readily rehumanise people by 
calling them by their name.  Second, our study supports the idea that patients and their 
relatives are generally the only source of continuity across a multi-professional pathway 
(Waring et al. 2015). They have a unique understanding, not only of their own care needs, 
but how multiple care providers can work together. As such patients and their relatives 
should, where possible, be involved in care planning to help ‘scaffold’ the system (O’Hara et 
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al. 2019). Third, health and care providers need to establish a common frame of reference 
and shared understanding of respective work routines and pressures in order to facilitate 
coordination (Waring et al. 2015). This might not necessarily involve expensive digital 
technologies, but more opportunities for face-to-face working and shared decision-making. 
Improving patient safety during hospital discharge will certainly rely upon better inter-
professional communication and coordination (Aase et al 2017); especially as these are 
important for developing a shared understanding of and responsibility for the person. 
However, over-reliance on standardised communication or decision-making procedures 
could further dehumanise people. Instead, improvements in hospital discharge, and other 
aspects of the care system, need to better recognise the potential for complex systems to 
exclude people because they ‘fall between the gaps’ of disciplinary sub-systems or 
technologies. 
 
In this paper, we are not suggesting that hospital discharge is in anyway equivalent to the 
Holocaust or other such atrocities; but the harms and degradations experienced by patient 
speak to similar thresholds of exclusion rooted in the modern state. Agamben (2005) 
associates these processes with socio-legal systems that are rooted in antiquity and 
systematically deprive people of their rights (i.e. sovereign bio-power). In the case of hospital 
discharge, and care systems more broadly, we suggest the production of ‘bare life’ is only 
partially a product of sovereign authority, for example, in the delegated legal powers of 
professionals to determine levels of care. Rather, we suggest patients can be reduced to their 
bare life inadvertently as result of the incompatibility of different disciplinary calculations and 
technologies within a broader state apparatus of care. Specifically, the ‘health-state of 
exception’ arises when the difficulties of knowing the patient, determining eligibility and 
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allocating responsible are manifest within a complex system of interdependent specialists 
interacting in dynamic and non-linear ways (author). Whereas Agamben’s work focuses 
primarily on political-legal systems, closer attention to the specific contexts and social 
practices through which exclusion and degradation occurs reveals a more complex form of 
decentred bio-power (Lemke 2002).  
 
By way of a provocative conclusion, we therefore return to Foucault’s (1998) observation 
that bio-power is concerned with the optimisation of the productive health of a given 
population. What we see in the case of hospital discharge, and other instances of sub-
standard care, is apparatus of bio-power that consistently fail, i.e. they harm the subjects 
they are intended to care for. This might therefore be interpreted as a problematic or failed 
apparatus. And yet, following Agamben (1998) and Bauman (1992) the ‘politics of death’ and 
the purification of society remain a primary function of bio-power; where, for example, it 
might be viewed by state actors as more expedient (and acceptable) to exclude those people 
that are beyond saving or unable to contribute to society. Our study suggests this is not a 
consequence of disciplinary design or sovereign power, but rather the inadvertent 
consequence of the incompatibility of disciplinary technologies, apparatus and calculations 
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